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Abstract
This paper considers a resource-constrained project scheduling prob-
lem with self-interested agents. A novel resource allocation model is
presented and studied in a mechanism design setting without money.
The novelties and specialties of our contribution include that the non-
renewable resources are supplied at different dates, the jobs requiring
the resources are related with precedence relations, and the utilities of
the agents are based on the tardiness values of their jobs. We modify a
classical scheduling algorithm for implementing the Serial Dictatorship
Mechanism, which is then proven to be truthful and Pareto-optimal.
Furthermore, the properties of the social welfare are studied.
Keywords Project scheduling, non-renewable resources, mechanism design
without money, Serial Dictatorship Mechanism
1 Introduction
Recently, there has been a growing interest in algorithmic mechanism de-
sign in the multi-agent researcher community. In large-scale systems with
strategic setting, such as cloud computing environments or manufacturing
systems, agents often possess private information, and since they are non-
cooperative, they intend to manipulate the outcome of the system for their
benefit. Allocation of multiple goods or resources is a frequently studied op-
timization problem of this sort. When the protocol controlling the system
behavior includes monetary transfers, setting the payments appropriately
can be used in order to avoid the manipulability, like in the case of the
Vickrey – Clarke – Groves mechanism [25]. If such transfers are not allowed,
usually only dictatorial mechanisms can prevent manipulations [1]. In this
paper, we study this latter situation specialized for a project scheduling
application. The novelties and specialties of our contribution are: (i) the
non-renewable (consumable) resources are supplied over the scheduling time
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horizon at different dates, (ii) the jobs requiring the resources are related
with precedence relations, and (iii) the utilities of the agents are not arbi-
trary, but based on the tardiness values of their jobs.
More specifically, we consider a project scheduling problem with non-
renewable resource constraints, where each project is owned by a selfish
agent. The projects consist of jobs that compete for commonly used re-
sources. In this paper we consider only non-renewable resources, such as
raw-materials, energy, money [13, 15], but even computational resources—
such as CPU, memory and network bandwidth—are frequently modeled as
consumable resources in cloud infrastructures, see e.g., [20]. The resources
are consumed by the jobs and they have an initial stock which is replen-
ished over time at given dates and in known quantities. The jobs have to be
executed while meeting precedence and resource constraints. That is, each
job may have some predecessors, all of which have to be completed prior
to starting the job, and it may require some non-renewable resources which
have to be on stock when starting the job, and once it is started, the stock
levels of the respective resources are decreased by the required quantities.
The stock levels can never be negative, so if the initial stock level of some
resource is not enough to complete all the jobs, some of them may have to
be delayed extra in order to meet the resource constraints. Each project has
a due date, and if it is completed afterwards, it will be tardy. A schedule
specifies the start time of each job, and it is feasible if all the precedence and
resource constraints are satisfied (see Fig. 1 for an illustration). Through-
out the paper we assume that the total supply from each resource equals
the total demand in order to guarantee the existence of feasible schedules.
Since the non-renewable resources are replenished over time, it is not obvi-
ous when to start the jobs when some optimization criteria are involved. In
the basic problem (where all data is publicly known, and there are no selfish
agents) a feasible schedule is sought in which the maximal tardiness among
the projects is as small as possible. This problem can be efficiently solved
by the method of Carlier and Rinnooy Kan [6].
Cumulative supply
Cumulative demand
Figure 1: A sample schedule with 3 projects and a single resource.
In a multi-agent environment, projects are owned by selfish agents, which
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want to minimize the tardiness of their own projects. The due date of a
project is only known by the corresponding agent. Further on, there is a
central inventory , which allocates the resources to the jobs of the projects
over time. However, there is also a conflict of interests: while the central
inventory still aims at minimizing the maximum tardiness over all projects
(this makes the most unhappy agent less unhappy)1, each agent is interested
in minimizing its own tardiness. Therefore, the agents are competing for the
resources, and they are inclined to be untruthful about their due dates in
hope of achieving a more advantageous resource allocation for themselves.
It is the central inventory, who can inspire the agents to tell their true due
dates by using a truthful allocation mechanism, which ensures that reporting
the true due dates yields the best outcome for each agent.
Main results of this paper. We investigate truthful mechanisms with-
out payments for the above project scheduling problem. We will show that
no truthful mechanism exists which always finds an optimal2 solution. Af-
ter this, we describe the Serial Dictatorship Mechnaism (SDM), which is
(weakly) truthful, and always finds a Pareto-optimal solution. Our SDM is
based on the polynomial time procedure of Carlier and Rinnooy Kan [6] for
solving the project scheduling problem (without agents). We will investi-
gate the properties of the SDM, and among others, we will show that it is
not able to find all Pareto-optimal solutions for the problem. We will also
summarize computational results. Further on, we define a randomized SDM
which can find any Pareto-optimal solution with positive probability.
The motivation for this research comes from real industrial production
environments, where project leaders (the agents in the model) want to re-
serve the necessary resources greedily, in many cases too early, and in larger
than necessary quantities, in order to finish their projects on time. Tradi-
tional approaches like prioritizing the most important products or customers
can help to alleviate the problem, but cannot guarantee any optimality cri-
teria. This situation also resembles to the coordination problem in supply
chains, but a crucial difference is that in the latter appropriate payments
can ensure truthfulness (see e.g., [12]).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we review the classical
scheduling model and its solution that will be the basis of the resource
allocation problem. In Section 4, the mechanism design model is introduced,
the impossibility of truthful and optimal mechanisms is proven, then the
SDM for the this problem is described and analyzed. Next, we present
a randomized version of the SDM in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, we
1In the mechanism design literature this is referred to as egalitarian social welfare,
which is considered more fair than minimizing the total tardiness, the utilitarian social
welfare [27]. However, most of the results presented in this paper remains valid when this
latter objective is considered instead.
2Throughout the paper we refer to optimality with respect to the objective of the
central inventory.
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conclude the results and mention some future research directions.
2 Literature review
Scheduling problems involving self-interested agents were already studied in
the seminal work about algorithmic mechanism design [25], and even earlier,
see e.g., [28]. Since then, several authors have combined scheduling and
mechanism design [10, 19], but most scheduling papers consider renewable
resources—such as machines—as agents. A large number of mechanisms
involve payments for incentivizing the agents in scheduling or allocation
settings [9, 22, 26]. Recently, mechanisms without money are also studied
for scheduling problems [14], but to the best of our knowledge, scheduling
mechanisms with non-renewable resources and without payments are not
yet investigated.
Our resource allocation problem is related to the one-sided matching
problems without money, such as the house allocation and the course allo-
cation [24]. These problems consist of two different sets of objects, where
the elements of one set (called applicants) have privately known preference
orderings over the elements of the other set [23]. This is in contrast with the
two-sided matching problems, where the elements of both sets have prefer-
ences over the elements of other set. The goal of the mechanism design for
these problems is to give a matching between the two sets that satisfy certain
properties, such as truthfulness and stability (e.g., Pareto-optimality)3.
For these matching problems, a frequently used mechanism is the Serial
Dictatorship Mechanism (SDM), which is in several cases the only mecha-
nism satisfying the required properties, and furthermore, it is straightfor-
ward to implement [2, 3]. An SDM considers a—random or pre-existing—
priority ordering of the applicants and works as follows. First, it determines
the set of optimal allocations with regard to the preferences of the appli-
cant with the highest priority. Then in each consecutive step, it takes the
set from the previous step, and determines a subset of the best allocations
considering the preferences of the next applicant. After the last applicant,
it yields an allocation from the final set. Note that if the preferences always
imply a unique preferred allocation, then only the preferences of the appli-
cant with the highest priority (the dictator) matters, which is the classical
dictatorship.
The house allocation problem is the one-to-one version of the one-sided
matching, where each applicant can be paired with at most one house, and
conversely, each house can be assigned to at most one applicant. For this
problem the SDM is truthful, and in addition, it can generate every Pareto-
optimal matchings—with different priority orderings—, and it is the only
Pareto-optimal mechanism [1].
3These properties will be formally defined in Section 4.
4
Dughmi and Ghosh study a one-sided, one-to-many General Assignment
Problem (GAP) without money, and some of its special cases [11]. In their
model, job agents should be matched with capacitated machines. The prob-
lem is formulated as an integer program, and by relaxing the integrality
constraints, an LP-based technique is shown to provide truthful approxi-
mate mechanisms.
The many-to-many extension of the one-sided matching is the course
allocation problem, where both the applicants and the courses have quotas
for their connections. The SDM can generate every Pareto-optimal match-
ings, however, it is truthful only in special cases [7, 8]. Kash et al. present a
dynamic version of the matching problem, where the agents are not present
simultaneously, but can arrive any time, and their demands are not known
in advance [20]. They regard renewable computational resources (such as
CPU and memory), but they consider them consumable, i.e., once allocated,
it is irrevocable, thus they are actually non-renewable.
Our resource allocation model is different from the above mentioned
matching problems in several aspects. First of all, the preferences are not
ordinal but cardinal, and not arbitrary: there is a scheduling problem in
the background with a predefined structure that influences the preferences.
For example, having a resource earlier is (weakly) preferred compared to
having it later—if the goal is to minimize the tardiness. The matching also
cannot be arbitrary, each job should be matched exactly with the required
resources, only the timing can vary. Furthermore, contrary to the house and
course allocation problems, the incoming batches of resources are divisible:
they can be shared among several jobs. However, since satisfying only a
part of the resource requirements has no value for the jobs, the problem
resembles more to the matching than the cake-cutting models [4, 27].
Finally, we mention that if in addition to non-renewable resources, the
processing of jobs also require some renewable resources, such as machines,
then quite a few results are known. Carlier was the first who studies ma-
chine scheduling problems with non-renewable resources in [5], and further
complexity results can be found in e.g., [15], [13]. The approximability of
machine scheduling problems is thoroughly studied for the makespan objec-
tive for single as well as parallel machine environments in [16, 17, 18], for the
maximum lateness objective in [18], and for the total weighted completion
time objective in [21].
3 The scheduling model
3.1 The project scheduling problem with non-renewable re-
sources
Let us consider a set of projects P . Each project p ∈ P has a due date
dp and a set of jobs Jp. Each job j ∈ Jp has a processing time tj . We
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assume that the Jp are disjoint and let J denote the union of all the Jp,
containing altogether n jobs. Each project has a set of precedence relations
Ap ⊂ Jp × Jp, and if (j, k) ∈ Ap then job j must be finished before k starts.
We assume that the precedence relations induce an acyclic graph.
There is a set of non-renewable resources R, where each ρ ∈ R has an
initial supply of bρ,1 at time u1 = 0, and additional supplies of bρ` at times
u` for ` = 2, . . . , q, where we assume that u1 < u2 < · · · < uq. Each job j
requires a quantity of aρj ≥ 0 of resource ρ ∈ R at its start.
We assume that for each resource ρ ∈ R the demand does not exceed
the supply, i.e.,
∑
j∈J aρj ≤
∑q
`=1 bρ`, otherwise the scheduling problem has
no solution. For simplicity, we assume equality without loss of generality.
Let I denote an instance of the scheduling problem defined by the above
introduced parameters.
We call µ = {µρj` } an allocation of the supplied resources to the jobs,
if for each resource ρ and time u`:
∑
j∈J µρj` = bρ`. We call an allocation
feasible, if every job j has enough resources allocated, i.e., ∀ρ ∈ R : aρj ≤∑q
`=1 µρj`.
4 Henceforward we consider only feasible allocations and refer to
them simply as allocation.
In order to have the schedule uniquely determined by an allocation, we
assume that each job starts as early as possible, i.e., when (i) all the required
resources are allocated to it, and (ii) every one of its predecessors defined
by the precedence constraints are finished. Let us denote therefore the start
time of job j ∈ Jp w.r.t. to allocation µ by
s
(µ)
j = min
s ≥ 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∀ρ :
∑
u`≤s
µρj` ≥ aρj ∧ ∀(k, j) ∈ Ap : e(µ)k ≤ s
 , (1)
where e
(µ)
k denotes the finish time of job k: e
(µ)
k = s
(µ)
k + tk.
Finally, let T
(µ)
p denote the tardiness of project p as the non-negative
difference between its due date and the maximal finish time of its jobs:
T (µ)p = max
{
max
j∈Jp
e
(µ)
j − dp, 0
}
. (2)
3.2 The Carlier – Rinnooy Kan algorithm
Carlier and Rinnooy Kan gave a polynomial time algorithm for solving the
above defined problem [6]. We briefly recapitulate the main ideas of their
solution here, since we are going to use a modified version of it in the SDM.
Let us consider the graph defined by the jobs as nodes and precedence
relations as edges, where the weight of edge (j, k) is tj . Let U(j) denote the
4Since we assumed that the total supply equals the total demand of the resources, it
is easy to see that equality holds in the definition of feasibility.
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set of all (direct or indirect) successors of job j, and Wjk the weight of the
maximal path length between jobs j and k ∈ U(j). For each project p, we
define the cost function for each job j ∈ Jp as fj(t) = max{ t − dp, 0 }, i.e.,
the tardiness of the job j finishing at time t, with regard to the project’s due
date. In addition, let Bρ(u`) =
∑`
τ=1 bρτ , the cumulative supply of resource
ρ until time u`.
Then one can define a lower bound on the maximal tardiness in the case
when u` is the first period when job j has all its required resources:
γ`j = max {fj(u` + tj),max{ fk(u` + tk +Wjk) | k ∈ U(j) }} . (3)
The algorithm seeks the smallest γ (denoting the maximal tardiness),
such that ∀ρ, ` : ∑j∈J{ aρj | γ < γ`j } ≤ Bρ(u`−1), where Bρ(u0) = 0 (see
Appendix A). For a fixed ` the smallest γ∗` can be found with a median
search procedure, and the optimal γ∗ = max` γ∗` , for more details, see [6].
Having the γ∗, the allocation µ can be computed by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Computing the allocation
Require: γ∗
for ` = 2 to q do
{Allocate resources to jobs that would be late starting at u`}
for j : γ`j > γ
∗ ∧ γ`−1j ≤ γ∗ do
Allocate the necessary resources to job j arbitrarily from the resources
arriving earlier than time u` and not yet allocated. (Due to the
construction of γ∗, there always exists enough free resources.)
end for
end for
for j : γqj ≤ γ∗ do
Allocate the necessary resources to job j arbitrarily from the resources
not yet allocated.
end for
4 Mechanism design for project scheduling
In the mechanism design problem we consider project agents with their due
dates as private information. All other information is assumed to be public
knowledge5. We examine the problem of a central inventory, which has to
allocate the resources supplied over time to the jobs.
5This restriction is not necessary, only assumed for keeping the model simple. The set
of private information can be extended to every parameter related to the projects. In this
case, one do not have to use a direct mechanism—i.e., where the agents should report the
full private information—only the aρj and γ`j values are required by the mechanism.
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We seek a direct revelation mechanism that consists of two steps: (i) col-
lecting due date information from the projects, and (ii) allocating resources
to the jobs. Since the project agents are interested in their own tardiness,
they might report false due dates to the central inventory in order to influ-
ence the allocation to their advantage. We refer to the reported due dates
as d′p. For practical reasons, we restrict our study to mechanisms without
money, i.e., it is not allowed to charge higher prices for resources arriving
earlier.
Definition 1 (Mechanism). Let I denote a scheduling problem instance.
A deterministic resource allocation mechanism is a function mapping the
problem instance to an allocation: Φ(I) = µ.
Definition 2 (Preference). Project p prefers allocation µ to µ′ (µ p µ′),
if T
(µ)
p < T
(µ′)
p , and weakly prefers µ to µ′ (µ p µ′), if T (µ)p ≤ T (µ
′)
p .
An important property of a mechanism is truthfulness, when the agents
cannot decrease their resulted tardiness by misreporting the due dates.
Truthfulness is a desired property of a mechanism, since with false (usu-
ally too early) due dates the inventory has no hope to take the tardinesses
into consideration.
Definition 3 (Truthfulness). Let I denote an arbitrary scheduling problem
instance and I ′p the same problem, but with due date d′p of project p instead
of dp. A mechanism Φ is truthful, if for each instance I, project p, and due
date d′p: Φ(I) p Φ(I ′p).
Note that the definition uses weak preference, thus reporting a false due
date does not necessarily worsen the tardiness of a project6. However, we
assume benevolent agents henceforward, i.e., they report truthfully, if they
cannot decrease their tardiness by misreporting.
Since in mechanism design it is often impossible to guarantee an optimal
solution, this is the situation in our model as we will see in Subsection 4.1,
therefore frequently weaker criteria are considered instead. A widely used
property for characterizing an acceptable solution is the Pareto-optimality,
when the resulted allocation cannot be improved for any agent without
damaging the others.
Definition 4 (Pareto-optimality). An allocation µ Pareto-dominates µ′, if
∀p : µ p µ′ and ∃p : µ p µ′. An allocation µ is Pareto-optimal, if no
other allocation Pareto-dominates it. A mechanism is Pareto-optimal, if for
all inputs it yields a Pareto-optimal allocation.
6Requiring strict preference would be problematic for the existence of truthful mecha-
nisms. For example, if a project has appropriately late due date, any feasible allocation
results in no tardiness for the project, thus reporting any due date results in the same
zero tardiness for the agent.
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Note that not every optimal allocation is Pareto-optimal, if we consider
the maximal tardiness, not the sum of the tardinesses. However, if an al-
location µ Pareto-dominates µ′, then the maximal tardiness implied by µ
cannot be greater than that of µ′. This property guarantees that there is at
least one optimal allocation among the Pareto-optimal ones.
4.1 Impossibility of truthful and optimal mechanisms
The first fundamental question we address is whether our scheduling problem
admits a mechanism which ensures that the benevolent players always tell
their true due dates, and always finds an optimal solution for the scheduling
problem (one minimizing the maximal tardiness of the projects)?
P
1
P
2
u
1
u
2
(a)
P
1
P
2
u
1
u
2
(b)
Figure 2: The optimal schedules in two different problem instances.
Proposition 1. There is no truthful mechanism that always returns an
optimal allocation.
Proof. By contradiction, suppose we have a mechanism that is truthful, and
on all inputs returns an optimal solution to the scheduling problem. Now we
examine how it works on the following problem instance I. There are only
two projects, p1 and p2, consisting of one job each, j1 and j2, respectively,
and a single resource ρ with an initial supply of bρ1 = 1 at u1 = 0, and
a second supply of bρ2 = 1 at u2 = 4. The two jobs are identical, i.e.,
tj1 = tj2 = 3, and aρj1 = aρj2 = 1, but project p1 has a due-date of dp1 = 4,
and project p2 has a due-date of dp2 = 5. Notice that in any feasible schedule
at most one job may start at u1 = 0, the other must wait for the second
supply at u2. Suppose both projects report their true due dates. Then the
algorithm must find the unique optimum in which j1 starts at u1, and j2
starts at u2. The tardiness of p1 is then 0, and that of p2 is 2 time units.
This is depicted in Figure 2a.
Now suppose p2 is not truthful, and reports d
′
p2 = 2 instead of its original
due date. On the one hand, since the algorithm is truthful, it should not
modify the optimal solution obtained for the true values (as there is a unique
optimum for the true due-dates). On the other hand, consider the problem
instance I ′ which differs from I only in the due date of p2, which is 2 in I ′.
Then, the algorithm must return the unique optimum for this instance, in
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which job j1 starts at u2, and job j2 starts at u1, giving a tardiness of 3 for
project p1, and 1 for project p2, see Figure 2b.
Since the algorithm has no information about the private due dates of the
projects, it cannot tell, whether p2 lies about its due date, or tells the truth.
So, it cannot be truthful and optimal at the same time, a contradiction.
Note that the claim of the proposition remains valid if we change the
optimality criterion to the total tardiness instead of the maximal tardiness.
Notice that the above impossibility result is not concerned with the com-
plexity of the optimization algorithm, which makes it even more general.
Corollary 1. The na¨ıve mechanism in which the central inventory com-
putes an optimal allocation with the Carlier–Rinnooy Kan algorithm is not
truthful.
This corollary implies that if the central inventory uses the na¨ıve mecha-
nism, it is beneficial for the projects to report as early due date as possible.
This corresponds to the industrial practice when everyone requests the re-
sources they are competing for immediately.
4.2 Serial Dictatorship Mechanism
Instead of minimizing the maximal tardiness as the na¨ıve mechanism, the
SDM considers a multi-objective optimization problem. It requires a prior-
ity ordering of the projects and generates an allocation that results in the
lexicographically smallest vector of the job tardiness values. For the sake of
simplicity we assume that the priority ordering is a fixed, commonly known
input of the mechanism.
The basic idea of the mechanism is to take the projects in decreasing
order of priority. In step 1, it takes the project p1 with the highest priority,
and creates an allocation µ(1) that minimizes T ′(µ
(1))
p1 , where T
′ denotes
the tardiness function of Eq. 2 considering the reported due dates instead
of the real ones. Then in each subsequent step k, a new allocation µ(k)
is computed that minimizes T ′(µ
(k))
pk
, with the constraints that it cannot
increase the tardinesses of the projects with higher priorities, i.e., ∀k′ ∈
{ 1, . . . , k − 1 } : T ′(µ(k))
p′k
≤ T ′(µ(k−1))
p′k
. The resulted tardinesses of projects
with lower priorities than pk are completely disregarded in step k.
The allocation µ(k) can be computed with a modified version of the Car-
lier – Rinnooy Kan algorithm. In step k, instead of γ`j , we use the following
γ
(k)
`j :
γ
(k)
`j =

γ′`j , j ∈ Jpk
∞, j ∈ Jp′k ∧ k′ < k ∧ γ′`j > T ′
(µ(k−1))
pk′
0 otherwise
, (4)
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where γ′`j is defined by Eq. 3, but considering the reported d
′
p due dates in
the cost function f instead of the real ones. For the jobs of project pk, this
involves the lower bounds γ′`j for the tardiness, while for any other job it is
either zero or infinity. For projects considered before pk, any allocation that
would result in larger tardiness for them than in the previous step, infinite
tardiness is used, these are therefore cannot start at u` or later. For the
remaining case (when γ
(k)
`j is defined as 0), the jobs may start at u` without
increasing the tardiness of the corresponding project.
Similarly to the original algorithm, we are looking for the smallest γ(k),
such that ∀ρ, ` : ∑j∈J{ aρj | γ(k) < γ(k)`j } ≤ Bρ(u`−1), see Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Serial Dictatorship Mechanism
Require: p1, . . . , pn: an arbitrary priority ordering of the projects
The projects announce their due dates to the central inventory
for k = 1 to n do
for ` = 1 to q do
Compute the γ
(k)
`j values
γ
(k)∗
` := min
{
γ(k) | ∀ρ : ∑j∈J{ aρj | γ(k) < γ(k)`j } ≤ Bρ(u`−1)}
end for
γ(k)∗ := max` γ
(k)∗
`
Compute µ(k)7
end for
Allocate the resources according to µ(n).
Theorem 1. The SDM is truthful.
Proof. Let us consider an arbitrary project pk. In steps 1, . . . , k − 1, the
due date d′pk is disregarded by the mechanism, therefore reporting it falsely
cannot decrease the tardiness of pk. In step k, the mechanism minimizes
the tardiness of pk with respect to the constraints derived from the previous
steps, and using the reported due date of pk. We claim that reporting a
false due date cannot decrease the tardiness of pk. For suppose, pk reports
a false due date d′pk < dpk and let µ
′(k) and µ(k) denote the corresponding
allocations. If the tardiness of pk is smaller with respect to µ
′(k) than that
for µ(k), then µ′(k) would be a better allocation for pk even when reporting
its true due date, which is a contradiction. In steps k′ = k + 1, . . . , n, the
tardiness T ′(µ
(k′))
pk
= T ′(µ
(k))
pk
remains constant: it cannot increase due to the
construction of the mechanism, but it also cannot decrease, otherwise µ(k)
is not optimal in step k, which is a contradiction.
7This is not necessary, since only the tardinesses of projects p1, . . . , pk are used in the
next step. For project pk this will be equal to γ
(k)∗, while for the other projects the
tardinesses remain the same as in the previous step.
11
Note that the proof of truthfulness requires that the agents cannot influ-
ence the priority ordering. From now on, we take advantage of its truthful-
ness, and assume that the SDM possesses the real due dates. Let us prove
the Pareto-optimality of the mechanism.
Theorem 2. The SDM is Pareto-optimal.
Proof. Let’s indirectly assume that ∃µ′ Pareto-dominating µ(n), i.e., ∀p ∈
P : µ′ p µ(n) and ∃pk : µ′ pk µ(n). This contradicts optimality of µ(k) in
step k, thus such µ′ cannot exist.
Corollary 2. If there is a schedule where no project is tardy, then the SDM
returns such a schedule.
For several matching problems, every Pareto-optimal solutions can be
generated by an SDM by using different priority orderings. Unfortunately,
this does not hold for our resource allocation problem. As a consequence,
although there exists at least one optimal allocation among the Pareto-
optimal ones, it is possible that such allocations cannot be found by any
SDM.
Proposition 2. Not every Pareto-optimal solution can be generated by an
SDM.
Proof. Let us consider a simple scheduling problem with two projects of two
jobs each, one resource and two supply times. Let dp1 = dp2 = u2, aρj1 =
aρj2 = aρj3 = aρj4 = 1, Ap1 = { (j1, j2) }, Ap2 = { (j3, j4) }, bρ1 = bρ2 = 2,
and tj1 = tj2 = tj3 = tj4 = (u2 − u1)/2.
P
1
P
2
u
1
u
2
(a) p1 with the higher priority
P
1
P
2
u
1
u
2
(b) p2 with the higher priority
P
1
P
2
u
1
u
2
(c) nondictatorial optimal solution
Figure 3: Pareto-optimal solutions of the problem.
There are only 2 SDMs for this problem, but 3 Pareto-optimal solutions
shown in Fig. 3. The two possible orderings of the projects for the SDM
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result in (maximal) tardiness tj1 + tj2 = tj3 + tj4 , illustrated in Figs 3a and
3b. However, the allocation shown on Fig. 3c is also Pareto-optimal and its
maximal tardiness is the half of what is achievable with an SDM.
Proposition 2 implies that using SDMs may exclude the possibility of
generating an optimal solution—despite always being Pareto-optimal. Un-
fortunately, there is an even more serious drawback of the SDMs. As the
next theorem shows, the difference between the optimal and the maximal
tardiness generated by an SDM is unbounded.
Proposition 3. The maximal tardiness found by the SDM can be arbitrary
far from the optimal.
Proof. Let us consider a simple scheduling problem with two projects of
one job each, one resource and two supply times. Let dp1 = u2, dp2 = u1,
aρj1 = aρj2 = 1, bρ1 = bρ2 = 1 and tj1 = tj2 (a fixed constant).
P
1
P
2
u
1
u
2
(a) The optimal solution
P
1
P
2
u
1
u
2
(b) Solution of the (p1, p2)-SDM.
Figure 4: Two possible allocations for the problem.
Fig. 4a illustrates the optimal schedule for this case, when the job of the
second project gets the resource at u1 and the other job at u2. This result in
tardinesses for both projects equal to their processing times. The solution
on Fig. 4b is resulted by an SDM where p1 has the higher priority. In order
to avoid (or minimize) its tardiness, the job of p1 must get the resource
arriving at u1. This results in u2−u1 + tj2 maximal tardiness at project p2.
As u2 → ∞, the maximal tardiness resulted by the optimal allocation
does not change, but with the SDM it grows infinitely.
Note that the claim of Proposition 3 remains valid if we change the
optimality criterion to the total tardiness instead of the maximal tardiness.
In order to compare the optimum of the scheduling problem with the
one obtained by SDM, we shift the tardiness values of schedules. That is,
the shifted tardiness value of a schedule s is
T∆s := Ts + uq.
The shifted tardiness of any feasible schedule is uq or more. Let T
∆
opt :=
Topt + uq denote the optimum tardiness increased by uq. The relative error
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of some schedule s is
Rel(s) :=
T∆s
T∆opt
. (5)
By this formula, the relative error of an optimal schedule is 1. The fol-
lowing easy observation shows that with this normalized objective function,
the relative error of those schedules obtained by SDM is at most 2.
Proposition 4. The relative error of any schedule computed by SDM is at
most 2.
Proof. In order to prove the statement, we define a trivial feasible schedule
with a relative error of at most 2, and argue that no job in a schedule
obtained by SDM starts later than the same job in the trivial schedule.
In the trivial schedule strivial all the jobs of all the projects are started
at time uq or later if they have some predecessors. More precisely, in the
trivial schedule first we schedule all the jobs without any predecessors at
time uq, then we schedule their immediate successors at the earliest possible
time without violating the precedence constraints, etc. (or in other words,
we schedule the jobs in topological order from time uq on without any unnec-
essary delays). The trivial schedule satisfies all the precedence constraints
by construction, and all the resource constraints as well, since by time uq,
all the resources are supplied, and the total supply equals the total demand
for each resource by assumption.
Now consider the output of SDM. Since it is Pareto-optimal, no job may
be started earlier without violating a resource constraint, or a precedence
constraint. Hence, in this schedule no job may be started later than the
same job in the trivial schedule.
Finally, we claim that the relative error of the trivial schedule is at most
2. On the one hand, in any feasible schedule, the tardiness of any project
is at least uq as we have already noted. Now consider the optimal schedule
sopt, and increase the start time of each job by uq. In the the resulting
schedule s′, every job starts after uq. Notice that in s′, no jobs starts before
the same job in the trivial schedule. Since the tardiness of each project is
increased by uq in s
′, we conclude that
Rel(strivial) =
T∆trivial
T∆opt
≤ T
∆
s′
T∆opt
=
T∆opt + uq
T∆opt
≤ Topt + 2uq
Topt + uq
≤ 2.
We can also get an upper bound on the absolute error of the schedule
resulted by the SDM. In order to do this, let us define a relaxed problem
without resource constraints. The optimal solution for this problem, srelaxed,
is when each job starts as early as possible: those jobs that do not have
predecessors start at u1 = 0, while others start as soon as their predecessors
14
are finished. Note that in srelaxed every job starts exactly uq time unit earlier
than in strivial. Thus, if Trelaxed and Tsdm denote the maximal tardiness of
srelaxed and a schedule resulted by an SDM, respectively, we have Trelaxed ≤
Topt ≤ Tsdm ≤ Ttrivial ≤ Trelaxed + uq. By rearranging these inequalities, we
get an upper bound for the absolute error:
Tsdm − Topt ≤ uq. (6)
4.3 Numerical study
In order to asses the performance of SDM in practice, we have conducted a
series of computational experiments. To this end, we have generated several
problem instances with various characteristics, and compared the maximal
tardinesses obtained by the Carlier – Rinnooy Kan algorithm and by the
SDM with a random priority ordering. For comparison, we used the relative
error defined by formula (5).
We have generated problem instances with |P | ∈ {10, 50, 100} projects
and q ∈ {5, 10, 15} supply dates. In all instances the number of jobs in
each project was |Jp| = 5. The project parameters were random numbers,
i.e., dp ∼ U(1, 50) for each project p, tj ∼ U(1, 5) and aρj ∼ U(0, 5) for
all the jobs j and resources ρ, where U(a, b) denotes the discrete uniform
distribution on the interval [a, b]. The density of the precedence graph of
each project was 0.2. The supplies were generated with u1 = 1, (u`−u`−1) ∼
U(1, 50/q), bρ` ∼ U(0,
∑
j aρj−Bρ(u`−1)), and bρq =
∑
j aρj−Bρ(uq−1). The
results show how the relative error varies depending on |P |, |R| and q. Each
value in Table 1 represents an average (or maximum) over 1000 problem
instances.
Tables 1a, 1c and 1e suggest that there are two ways to decrease the
expected error: with more frequent supplies or with less resources. When
the number of supplies increases, there are usually more opportunities to
schedule the non-tardy projects closer to their due dates, thus freeing some
resources for the low priority projects. Decreasing the number of resources
seems to be difficult in practice, but only the scarce resources are relevant for
the problem. If the inventory keeps enough safety stock, then that resource
does not constrain the schedule, thus it can be omitted from the model. Of
course, both approaches come at a price which should be considered and
balanced with the estimated cost of the tardiness.
Tables 1b, 1d and 1f presents the maximum error considering the same
instances as for the average. Similarly to the average case, the maximum
error also decreases when q increases. Furthermore, it can be observed that
the maximum error tends to decrease with more projects. Since these values
are the extreme cases, it is more difficult finding trends in these tables, but
they can be used for estimating the worst case scenarios.
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Resources (|R|)
1 2 4 6 8 10
q
5 103% 106% 108% 110% 110% 112%
10 101% 101% 102% 103% 102% 103%
15 100% 101% 101% 101% 101% 101%
(a) Average with |P | = 10 projects
Resources (|R|)
1 2 4 6 8 10
q
5 181% 181% 181% 174% 182% 171%
10 168% 167% 151% 151% 152% 161%
15 154% 149% 134% 155% 129% 156%
(b) Maximum with |P | = 10 projects
Resources (|R|)
1 2 4 6 8 10
q
5 104% 107% 111% 114% 117% 118%
10 101% 102% 103% 104% 104% 104%
15 100% 101% 101% 101% 102% 102%
(c) Average with |P | = 50 projects
Resources (|R|)
1 2 4 6 8 10
q
5 172% 173% 175% 183% 176% 171%
10 131% 132% 149% 135% 149% 150%
15 116% 120% 125% 118% 117% 123%
(d) Maximum with |P | = 50 projects
Resources (|R|)
1 2 4 6 8 10
q
5 105% 108% 112% 115% 119% 119%
10 101% 102% 103% 104% 104% 106%
15 100% 101% 101% 101% 102% 102%
(e) Average with |P | = 100 projects
Resources (|R|)
1 2 4 6 8 10
q
5 166% 176% 168% 170% 175% 171%
10 136% 168% 135% 139% 138% 140%
15 125% 120% 123% 115% 120% 126%
(f) Maximum with |P | = 100 projects
Table 1: Average and maximum relative errors
5 SDM with random endowments
In order to remedy the negative consequences of Proposition 2, we introduce
a randomized extension of the SDM in this section.
Definition 5 (Randomized mechanism). A randomized mechanism is a
probability distribution over a family {Φr } of deterministic mechanisms.
A randomized mechanism is called truthful ( Pareto-optimal), if each deter-
ministic mechanism in its support is truthful (Pareto-optimal).
Let us modify the SDM such that it starts with a random (feasible)
allocation µ(0), and in each step k it makes a Pareto-improvement on it,
resulting in allocation µ(k). This randomized mechanism can be interpreted
as follows: given an r random allocation, the Φr is a deterministic mechanism
that executes Pareto-improvements on the allocation r according to the given
priority ordering. Then the SDM with random endowments (SDMRE) is a
probability distribution over {Φr }.
The initial allocation can be computed for example with Algorithm 3.
Note that this algorithm cannot result in all possible feasible allocations:
whenever a supply and a demand is chosen, either the whole demand will
be covered with the allocation or the whole supply will be allocated for that
demand. It is easy to see however, that any allocation can be transformed
into an allocation that can be the output of Algorithm 3 and they both
result in the same schedule (start times). Therefore this method does not
exclude any significant solutions.
The allocation µ(k) can be computed with a modified version of the SDM
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Algorithm 3 Computing a random allocation
for ` = 1 to q do
for ρ ∈ R do
while bρ` > 0 do
Let j be a random job such that aρj > 0
Let µρj` = min{ aρj , bρ` }
Decrease aρj and bρ` with the allocated quantity min{ aρj , bρ` }
end while
end for
end for
algorithm, where in step k we use the following γ
(k)
`j :
γ
(k)
`j =

γ′`j , j ∈ Jpk
∞, j ∈ Jpk′ ∧ k′ 6= k ∧ γ′`j > T ′(µ
(k−1))
pk′
0 otherwise
. (7)
For project pk, this takes the lower bounds of the tardiness, while for any
other job it is either zero or infinity. For projects other than pk, any alloca-
tion that would result in larger tardiness for them than in the previous step,
infinite tardiness is considered, these are therefore excluded from an optimal
solution. Any other allocation is allowed, thus they cause no tardiness in
this step. This means that the algorithm minimizes the tardiness of project
pk, while enforces an upper bound on the other projects’ tardinesses.
Similarly to the SDM, we are looking for the smallest γ(k), such that
∀ρ, ` : ∑j∈J{ aρj | γ(k) < γ(k)`j } ≤ Bρ(u`−1), see Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 SDM with Random Endowments (SDMRE)
Require: p1, . . . , pn: an arbitrary ordering of the projects
Let µ(0) be a random (feasible) allocation
The projects announce their due dates to the central inventory
for k = 1 to n do
for ` = 1 to q do
Compute the γ
(k)
`j values
γ
(k)∗
` := min
{
γ(k) | ∀ρ : ∑j∈J{ aρj | γ(k) < γ(k)`j } ≤ Bρ(u`−1)}
end for
γ(k)∗ := max` γ
(k)∗
`
Compute µ(k)
end for
Allocate the resources according to µ(n)
Theorem 3. The SDMRE is truthful.
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Proof. Let us consider an arbitrary step k of the mechanism. Since the
algorithm minimizes the tardiness of pk in this step, it cannot benefit from
a false d′pk . For any other k
′ 6= k, the T ′(µ(k−1))pk′ tardiness serves only as a
constraint on the T ′(µ
(k))
pk′ , which both change similarly depending on dp′k .
Therefore also pk′ cannot benefit from reporting a false due date.
Note that the proof of truthfulness requires that the agents can influence
neither the priority ordering nor the initial allocation. It is easy to see
that the SDMRE is also Pareto-optimal, and in addition, since the initial
allocation is arbitrary (any Pareto-optimal allocation can be generated with
positive probability), the following theorem is true:
Theorem 4. An allocation is Pareto-optimal if and only if it can be resulted
by an SDMRE.
Note however, that since every Pareto-optimal solution can be the output
of the SDMRE, the claim of Proposition 3 is still valid for this mechanism.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we introduced the non-renewable resource allocation problem
for project scheduling and examined the properties of the SDM and SDMRE
in this setting. We proved their truthfulness and Pareto-optimality, and
identified some of their limitations considering optimality.
It would be interesting to investigate realistic special cases for the schedul-
ing problem. For example, the supply of resources is usually not random,
but follows some pattern resulted from the applied ordering policy, such
as the fixed order quantity or fixed time period. Another possibility is to
consider similar projects, which occurs when the products with different
features define almost identical projects with slightly different resource re-
quirements. The model also could be extended, e.g., with renewable resource
constraints, for which case the computational complexity introduces addi-
tional challenges.
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A Modification of the Carlier – Rinnooy Kan algo-
rithm
In [6], the following inequalities can be found (considering only a single
resource): ∀` : ∑j∈J{ aj | γ ≤ γ`j } ≤ B(u`), and “for fixed `, the smallest
value γ∗` for which [the inequality] is satisfied can be found by a median
finding procedure [. . . ]”. However, such smallest value γ∗` may not exist.
Consider the following simple example with a single job j and one resource
only. There are two supplies at times u1 = 0, and u2 = 1 with supplied
quantities b1,1 = 1 and b1,2 = 1, respectively, and demand aj = 2. Hence,
the cumulative supplies are B(u1) = 1 and B(u2) = 2, respectively, and job
j can start only at u2. Then for ` = 1, with γ = γ1,1 the inequality does not
hold, but for any  > 0, with γ = γ1,1 +  the inequality is satisfied, since
the left-hand-side is 0.
Thus we use ∀ρ, ` : ∑j∈J{ aρj | γ < γ`j } ≤ Bρ(u`−1) instead. We
now show that if these inequalities are satisfied, then the resulted maxi-
mal tardiness cannot be greater than γ in an optimal schedule. Let us
indirectly assume that for an optimal µ allocation there exists a project p
with T
(µ)
p > γ. This means that ∃j∗ ∈ Jp : fj∗(e(µ)j∗ ) > γ. Let us consider
a chain (j1, . . . , jlmax = j
∗), where (jl, jl+1) ∈ Ap and e(µ)jl = s
(µ)
jl+1
, but there
exists no job k with (k, j1) ∈ Ap and e(µ)k = s(µ)j1 . Then s
(µ)
j1
= u` must hold
for some `. But then, by definition, γ`j1 = fj∗(e
(µ)
j∗ ) > γ, and neither the
precedence constraints (by the choice of j1), nor resource availability (since∑
j∈J{ aρj | γ < γ`j } ≤ Bρ(u`−1) by assumption) blocks j1, which contra-
dicts the assumption that j1 starts at the earliest start time permitted by
the resource and the precedence constraints.
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